Many people expect the Internet to change American politics -most likely in the direction of increasing direct citizen participation and forcing government officials to respond more quickly to voters' concerns. An initiative petition with these objectives is currently circulating in California that would authorize use of electronic signatures over the Internet to qualify candidates, initiatives, and other ballot measures.
voters would be able to view and download information about proposed initiatives on Internet websites, sign petitions on a computer, and transmit their signatures over the Internet to be counted toward the total needed for ballot qualification. For greater security, Internet petition signing would likely use "digital signatures" that employ advanced encryption techniques, possibly on "smart cards" containing computer chips, as well as state-approved "certification authorities" that vouch for the signer's identity. Digital signatures would then be decrypted and matched against the current list of registered voters under the supervision of state and county election officials.
However, security problems of networked computers make Internet petition signing potentially vulnerable to fraud and other abuse. Although few e-commerce and e-government transactions in the United States today use digital signatures, smart cards, or certification authorities, the industry is investing heavily to enhance online security. Given the commercial pressure to reduce risks and losses from large numbers of Internet transactions, identification and security methods will undoubtedly improve, and it seems highly likely that the commercial world will find workable solutions. Additional efforts to develop Internet voting, both for government and non-government elections, will also spur the development of better security approaches. Even so, the security standards must be tighter for Internet voting or petition signing than for ecommerce in order to maintain public trust in the election process.
The costs associated with Internet petition signing include those required to issue smart cards, digital signature certificates, and encryption keys to voters; the costs of developing the infrastructure to renew certificates and to revoke and Although limited access to the Internet remains a problem, its magnitude seems to be diminishing over time. Survey data report that more than two-thirds of California adults were Internet users as of October 2000 but that Internet use varies considerably by race and ethnicity, income, education level, age, and region. Although these gaps are steadily shrinking, market and demographic factors alone will not bring all Californians online. As a consequence, any nearterm implementation of Internet petition signing should include access provisions for those who are not connected to the Internet at home, school, or work.
Beyond the issues of security, cost, and access lie larger questions about the effects of Internet signature gathering on direct democracy. Would it encourage greater and more informed public participation in the political process? Or would it flood voters with ballot measures and generally worsen current problems with the initiative process itself? Because we lack good data on these questions and systematic studies of them, today's answers to them are largely conjectural. We simply do not understand the full implications of using the Internet for petition signing or voting. We can be fairly sure, however, that Internet petition signing, like Internet voting, will have unintended consequences. That may be reason enough for many to oppose its early implementation in California, but it will not make the concept disappear. Its proponents are likely to gain strength as young people who have grown up with the Internet reach voting age. Internet petition signing seems to be an idea whose time is not yet ripe but is clearly ripening. Its emergence on the political horizon should spur reformers of the initiative process to get on with their work before they are overtaken by events in cyberspace.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet changes everything" is a mantra familiar to technologists, entrepreneurs, and the media. 1 Indeed, the Internet has already transformed many organizations and business sectors and profoundly affected others. These trends suggest to many that the Internet will inevitably change American politics -most likely in the direction of increasing direct citizen participation and forcing government officials to respond more quickly to voters' concerns. Certainly the dramatic vote counting problems in the 2000 presidential election have brought new calls for using the Internet in state and federal elections. 2 Although attention has focused primarily on Internet voting, efforts are also under way to authorize the use of electronic signatures over the Internet to qualify candidates, initiatives, and other ballot measures. An initiative petition is currently circulating in California that would submit such a plan to voters in March 2002. 3 Petition signing on the Internet would draw on the technologies and processes developed for electronic commerce ("e-commerce"). It would also draw on the growing use of the Internet for disseminating government information and facilitating online communications and transactions between citizens and government ("e-government"). Its proponents claim that Internet signature gathering will significantly lower the cost of qualifying initiatives and thereby reduce the influence of organized, well-financed interest groups. They also maintain that Internet petition signing will increase both public participation in the political process and public understanding about specific measures. However, questions about security and access pose significant problems for Internet signature gathering, as they do for casting and counting ballots using the Internet. 4 Some observers also express concern that Internet petition signing would make qualifying initiatives too easy and thus further distance the initiative process from the deliberative political discourse envisioned by the framers of the U.S. and California constitutions. This paper explores the prospects for and issues surrounding Internet petition signing in California. After describing how voters would use the Internet to "sign" petitions and how their electronic or digital signatures could be verified, it goes on to discuss security, cost, access, and equity issues that pose significant obstacles to online petition signing. It then outlines trends in Internet voting, ecommerce, and e-government that may affect the development of Internet petition signing. The final section discusses some broader implications of the Internet for the initiative process, summarizes the arguments pro and con, and concludes that while Internet petition signing is not ready to be implemented in the next election cycle, public pressure to authorize it will continue to build and could prove unstoppable over the next few years. 
HOW WOULD INTERNET PETITION SIGNING WORK?
Initiative petitions must receive a specified number of valid signatures from registered voters to be placed on the ballot. 5 Proposals of Internet petition signing would change existing election laws to permit registered voters to sign petitions on a computer and transmit their signatures over the Internet to be counted toward the required total. Nearly all such proposals would permit signing at any computer, so long as proper security procedures were followed. At least for the foreseeable future, however, Internet petition signing would complement rather than supplant conventional methods of gathering written signatures.
Internet signature gathering requires at least the following three technical components:
• One or more websites that display the text of the proposed initiative on the public Internet;
• Means for voters to sign the initiative petition and transmit their signatures to the officials certifying them; and These laws basically state that a signature, document, or record may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form. 10 The laws deliberately do not specify the methods to be used for electronic signatures or the level of security required.
California's UETA statute broadly defines an electronic signature as "an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the electronic record." 11 Thus, a customer can make a legally binding purchase simply by clicking on an icon shown on the computer screen so long as the 6 Although denial of service attacks are very real threats to election websites, they pose a more serious problem to Internet voting, which is conducted over a short period of time, than to initiative signature gathering, which is carried out over several months. 7 For example, hackers may be able to divert traffic from a legitimate website to one with a similar look that they have created; they could then fool users into revealing passwords, credit card numbers, or other personal information. petition signing thus appears technically feasible, although it raises a number of security, cost, and access issues which are discussed in the next section.
SECURITY, COST, AND ACCESS ISSUES Security Issues Surrounding Internet Petition Signing
Newspapers regularly report the exploits of hackers who have broken in to supposedly secure computer networks, reminding us that perfect security will never be achieved in computer systems or any other human endeavor. 17
Internet petition signing is potentially vulnerable at several points and levels of the process. Websites displaying initiatives can be altered, "spoofed," or made unreachable for extensive periods of time. Private keys are usually protected by passwords that may be all-too-easily accessible or otherwise compromised.
Thus, a voter's private key can be willingly or unwittingly given to someone else or copied remotely by a sophisticated intruder, who can then use it to sign petitions. 18 Viruses or other malicious code can be introduced to copy a private key or substitute another. Smart card readers can be similarly compromised.
Individuals working for a certification authority, or election officials can be corrupted. The list of possible security breaches goes on. Systems that would allow online petition signing from a home or office PC are vulnerable to malicious code or remote control attacks on the PC that might prevent the signing of a petition, or spy on the process, or permit additional petitions to be signed that the voter did not intend to sign, all without detection. Hence, for the same reasons that we do not recommend Internet voting from machines not controlled by election officials, we cannot recommend similar systems for petition-signing until such time as there is a practical solution to the general malicious code problem and the development of a system to electronically verify identity.
While there are similarities between voting and petition signing, it is important to note that the two are not identical and they have somewhat different cost and security properties:
• Petition signing is a year-round activity, whereas voting occurs during a limited time window. Hence, servers and other infrastructure needed to support petition signing would need to be running year-round, instead of just during a time window before election day. This may dramatically increase the total cost of managing the system. • While it is reasonable to expect voters, for security reasons, to submit a signed request for Internet voting authorization each time before they vote (similar to a request for an absentee ballot), it is not reasonable to expect voters to submit such a request each time they wish to sign a petition. As a result, voters who wish to sign petitions electronically would likely have to be issued authorization (means of authentication) that is openended in time. The longer such authorizations are valid, the more likely it is that some of them will be compromised, or sold, reducing the integrity of the petition-signing system over time.
• Voters can sign any number of petitions in an election cycle. Hence, a compromised authorization to sign petitions would be usable for signing any number of petitions, magnifying the damage to the system's integrity. 21 Although these three bulleted objections should not be minimized, e-commerce sites face similar problems and are successfully using encrypted electronic signatures to deal with them (see Section 4). Of course, e-commerce firms can apply risk management concepts and tools to keep losses from security lapses at an acceptable level, whereas public trust in the initiative process may well require a higher standard. The questions then become: How secure must
Internet petition signing be to gain voters' trust, and can that level of security be achieved at acceptable cost?
The security implications of Internet petition signing are not entirely negative.
Compared to present methods, it could also improve verification of voter signatures. In California, county clerks now examine a random sample of 500 signatures or 3 percent of the total, whichever is higher. added security, an automated query might be sent to a sample of electronic signers at their registered postal or e-mail addresses, asking them to confirm by return mail or e-mail that they actually had signed the petition.
The Costs of Internet Petition Signing
Advocates of Internet petition signing forecast dramatically lower costs both for initiative proponents and for county and state offices that process their petitions. remains for those without some college education. 36 The generation gap is also shrinking steadily, but it will probably take two to four years before more than half of Californians age 65 and over are Internet users. 37 Given these remaining disparities, any near-term implementation of Internet petition signing should include access provisions for those who are not connected to the Internet. 
IS INTERNET PETITION SIGNING INEVITABLE? TRENDS IN INTERNET VOTING, E-COMMERCE, AND E-GOVERNMENT
Proponents of Internet signature gathering argue that the Internet is an unstoppable force that is transforming all private and public sector activities and will soon be used for petition signing, voting, and other political processes.
Because this outcome is inevitable, they contend, citizens and government officials should start planning to integrate Internet petition signing into the political system in ways that will best support core democratic values. This section discusses trends and developments in Internet voting, e-commerce, and e-government and the extent to which they may spur public interest in and acceptance of Internet petition signing. During the first twelve hours of the 10-day voting period, some 2,800 of the 76,000+ At Large members encountered an error message when attempting to submit their votes. The difficulty was caused by the interaction of election.com's voting system with ICANN's encryption routine… The situation was identified and corrected within the first 12 hours of the voting period. ICANN members that were affected by the situation were notified immediately via e-mail, and were directed to log on and cast their vote. Of the 2,800 people who received an error on their first attempt, 2,685 returned to the site and successfully cast their votes. 50 The ICANN election shows that Internet voting with digital signatures can work with large numbers of dispersed voters, but also that technical problems are likely to arise in the early implementations. These problems would have to be solved before online voting is used widely in binding government elections. As
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Zoe Baird, president of the Markle Foundation, said afterwards: "[The ICANN
election was] far from perfect…It is now imperative that the data from this election experiment be thoroughly analyzed and available for public scrutiny so that the dialogue can continue and the system can be improved. 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
To this observer, Internet petition signing does not yet seem ready for implementation in California or other states, but pressures for it seem likely to increase as more people use the Internet regularly to pursue their personal and professional interests, e-commerce, and interactions with government.
Current Obstacles and Ameliorating Trends
Security, access, and cost remain the principal obstacles to implementation of Internet petition signing. The security concerns associated with signing a petition on a remote computer are very real and appear difficult, but not impossible, to resolve satisfactorily. The continuing growth of e-commerce and new experiments with Internet voting will bring with them considerably more experience with digital signatures, biometrics, and other security approaches over the next few years. Given the commercial pressure to reduce risks and losses from large numbers of online transactions, identification and security methods will undoubtedly improve, and it seems highly likely that the commercial world will find workable solutions. Whether and when such solutions will be adequate to maintain public trust in remote signing of initiative petitions remains to be seen.
As costs decrease and a new, Internet-savvy generation reaches voting age, equity and access concerns will diminish but not disappear. television and radio. 62 In principle, the Internet is an ideal medium for presenting detailed information about specific initiatives and the groups supporting or opposing them. Internet websites can also link this information to relevant commentaries and other sources. Voters who seek information in greater depth than ballot pamphlets 63 and the mass media provide would be able to find it on the Internet. 64 As one example, California now requires all committees supporting and opposing ballot propositions that raise or spend $50,000 or more to file lists of contributors and contributed amounts electronically. This information is then made publicly available on the Secretary of State's website. 65 A related question is whether and to what extent the Internet will encourage greater and more informed public participation in the initiative process. Initiative websites could include interactive message boards that stimulate public discussion and debate, as other websites now offer on nearly every conceivable topic. It is certainly true that website message boards often spiral down into banal chatter or diatribe; nevertheless, many examples of sustained, spirited discussions on serious topics also can be found. The Internet's capacity to allow substantial numbers of people interact over an extended period of time could counter another central criticism of initiatives: that they do not foster a structured, deliberative political process so essential to representative democracy.
An interesting recent proposal would use the Internet for public discussion of initiatives during the drafting process so that the proposed language could be debated and modified before seeking ballot qualification. 66 This proposal would require major changes in the current legislation governing initiatives as a way of developing a forum "in which the mix of professional and public voices could create a deeply deliberative process of public law." 67 Of course, others will make precisely the opposite argument, contending that the Internet favors nondeliberative, emotional responses that only exacerbate the flaws of initiatives and other tools of direct democracy. In all likelihood, the Internet can and will be used in both ways simultaneously.
Perhaps the most significant question raised by Internet petition signing is whether its chief effect would be to worsen current problems surrounding the initiative process itself. Lowering the cost to qualify an individual initiative could inundate voters with ballot measures at every election and might, in fact, increase the total sum spent on initiatives. Along with sheer number of items to be voted on, the influence of money and organized interest groups could increase. 68 Such concerns about intensifying the negative aspects of direct democracy, like the hopes for a positive Internet role in spurring informed public participation, are conjectural. We lack good data or systematic studies on these points 69 and simply do not understand the full implications of using the Internet for petition signing or voting. The Internet can help level the political playing field among candidates and initiative proponents, but it could also exacerbate the influence of well-heeled contributors and organized interest groups. It can inform and encourage participation among voters in ways other media cannot, but it could also stimulate and reward superficial, emotional responses. It can be used for serious deliberation and debate on proposed initiatives among informed citizens, but it could also lead to an explosion of easy-to-qualify ballot measures with disastrous results for representative government.
We can be fairly sure, however, that Internet signature gathering, like Internet voting, will have unintended consequences. That prospect may be reason enough for many to oppose its early implementation in California, but it will not make the concept disappear. Its proponents will likely gain strength as more young people who have grown up with the Internet reach voting age and see no reason why they should not engage in political activities online as they do in all other areas.
Internet petition signing seems an idea whose time is not yet ripe but is clearly ripening. Its emergence on the political horizon should spur reformers of the initiative process to get on with their work before they are overtaken by events in cyberspace.
